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SOBRIETY CHECKPOINTS: CLEARING THE
ROADS FOR ROADBLOCKS UNDER
MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE
POLICE V. SITZ
by Jennifer A. Currie
N 1986, the Michigan Department of State Police devised a sobriety
checkpoint program to identify drunk drivers. At selected locations, po-
lice would stop all vehicles and briefly examine each driver for signs of
intoxication. If the officer subjectively suspected intoxication, he could, at
his discretion, require the driver to appear at a secondary location. At this
secondary location, the officer would conduct further sobriety tests and ex-
amine the driver's license and vehicle registration. If the officer's suspicions
persisted, he could arrest the driver. One day prior to the implementation of
this program, Rick Sitz filed suit against the Michigan State Police and its
director.' Sitz sought and obtained a declaratory judgment and injunctive
relief prohibiting the initiation of the sobriety checkpoint program. 2
The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's conclusion that
the sobriety checkpoints violated the fourth amendment search and seizure
clause of the United States Constitution.3 The appellate court applied a
three-prong balancing test citing "the state's interest in [the] prevention of
alcohol related accidents; the sobriety checkpoint's ability to achieve that
goal; and the intrusion on individual privacy."'4 The court discussed the
state's legitimate interest in implementing the program, but held that the
1. Sitz v. Department of State Police, 170 Mich. App. 433, 429 N.W.2d 180, 181 (Mich.
App. 1988). Sitz and the five other plaintiffs were licensed Michigan drivers who traveled
throughout the state. Id
2. Id.
3. Id. at 185. The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution states, inter alia,
that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons... and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated.. . ." U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV. Sitz originally
claimed that the checkpoint violated both the United States Constitution and the Michigan
Constitution. The relevant portion of the Michigan Constitution states that, "[t]he person,
houses, papers and possessions of every person shall be secure from unreasonable searches and
seizures. No warrant to search any place or to seize any person or things shall issue without
describing them, nor without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation." M.C.L.A.
CONST. art. I, § 11. Since the Michigan Court of Appeals held the sobriety checkpoint invalid
under the United States Constitution, the Court did not consider the validity of the checkpoint
under the Michigan Constitution. Sitz, 429 N.W.2d at 185.
4. Sitz, 429 N.W.2d at 182.
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intrusion substantially interfered with personal liberties5 and that the state
afforded no empirical proof that the checkpoints actually would curtail
drunk driving.6 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to de-
termine the constitutionality of the checkpoints under the fourth amend-
ment.7 Held, reversed and remanded: Brief stops at sobriety checkpoints to
question drivers for signs of intoxication without probable cause or reason-
able suspicion do not violate the individual's right to be free from unreasona-
ble search and seizure under the fourth amendment. Michigan Department
of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S.Ct. 2481, 2488, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412, 423 (1990).
I. REASONABLENESS UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution protects "the
individual's legitimate expectations [of privacy] that in certain places and at
certain times he has the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of
rights and the right most valued by civilized men."' 8 The Supreme Court has
interpreted the fourth amendment as "safeguard[ing] the privacy and secur-
ity of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials," 9
and has mandated courts to weigh the protection provided by the fourth
amendment against the reasonableness of an officer's search and seizure
under the circumstances.10
A traditional search and seizure as a prelude to an arrest requires probable
cause and a search warrant. I' The Supreme Court has recognized that prob-
able cause is not necessarily a prerequisite, however, for a constitutional
search and seizure.12 As a result, searches and seizures which are less intru-
sive than a traditional arrest may comply with the fourth amendment when
5. Id. at 184. Individual intrusion is judged both on the objective level, which includes
the stop itself, the visual inspection of the car, and the type of questioning involved, and the
subjective level which involves any concern or fear generated in law abiding motorists. d; see
also Jacobs and Strossen, Mass Investigations Without Individualized Suspicion: A Constitu-
tional and Policy Critique of Drunk Driving Roadblocks, 18 U.C. DAVis L. REv. 595, 649
(1985) (discussion of objective and subjective intrusion).
6. Sitz, 429 N.W.2d at 184. As evidence of the ineffectiveness of the procedures, the
court cited the low proportion of arrested drunk drivers to the number of cars stopped at the
roadblock. Id
7. Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 2484, 110 L. Ed. 2d 418,
419 (1990).
8. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 758 (1985) (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 430, 478 (1927)).
9. See, e.g., Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967) (discussion of purpose
of fourth amendment); Marshall v. Barlows, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312 (1978) (fourth amendment
serves to safeguard individual's right to privacy); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979)
(discussion of protection from arbitrary invasions by governmental officials).
10. Camara, 387 U.S. at 527.
11. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970). The probable cause requirement is
"the best compromise that has been found for accommodating" the opposing interests of indi-
vidual privacy and effectiveness of law enforcement. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160,
176 (1949). For a definition and discussion of the probable cause standard, see Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132, 161 (1925).
12. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). For an excellent discussion on the application of
probable cause and reasonable suspicion by the Supreme Court after Terry v. Ohio, see Was-
serstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 257 (1984).
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reasonableness can be shown by "specific and articulable facts which, taken
together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that
intrusion."1 3 The Court has further held that when procedures are mini-
mally intrusive on individual rights, courts should substitute probable cause
and reasonable suspicion for a balancing test weighing the state's interest in
implementing the program, the effectiveness of the procedure, and the intru-
sion on individual liberties.' 4
Specifically, a seizure occurs when a law enforcement officer stops a vehi-
cle.13 When such seizure occurs, individual states must uphold any fourth
amendment protections.' 6 The Supreme Court, however, interpreted the
fourth amendment to allow state courts addressing search and seizure proce-
dures involving vehicles to require less than the traditional probable cause
requirement to satisfy reasonableness. 17 Depending upon the situation, the
Supreme Court has articulated three standards to evaluate the constitutional
validity of vehicle search and seizure at immigration and administrative
checkpoints: probable cause, reasonable suspicion, or a balancing test.' 8
A. Immigration Checkpoints
The Supreme Court has held that in situations where a border patrol of-
ficer conducts a search and a seizure, the level of intrusion on an individual
is not minimal and the officer must have probable cause. '9 The government
in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States20 argued that a roving patrol had dis-
cretionary authority to stop and search any car for illegal alien transporta-
tion.2' The Supreme Court, concerned with the broad discretionary power
13. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.
14. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 49, 51 (1979).
15. Brower v. County of Inyo, 109 S. Ct. 1378, 1381, 103 L. Ed. 2d 628, 635 (1989). A
seizure occurs when the government terminates a person's "movement through means inten-
tionally applied." Id. (emphasis in original).
16. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961). The rights under the fourth amendment
are made applicable to the individual states through the fourteenth amendment. Id See also
Ker v. State of California, 374 U.S. 23, 30 (1963) (fourth amendment is enforceable against
states by application of the same constitutional standard prohibiting unreasonableness).
17. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976). The Court cited two distinc-
tions between homes or offices and vehicles. First, automobile mobility often makes it imprac-
tical to enforce strict warrant requirements in certain circumstances. Second, an individual's
expectation of privacy in a vehicle is considerably less than in her home because of extensive
governmental regulations involved in vehicle use and licensing, as well as the inherently public
nature of driving. Id at 367. The applicability of this case to aircraft, mobile homes, and
other forms of transportation has yet to be decided. Mobile homes would seem to present the
court with the peculiar issue of whether a mobile home is a house or a vehicle.
18. See infra text p. 1279-83. See Note, Curbing the Drunk Driver Under the Fourth
Amendment: The Constitutionality of Roadblock Seizures, 71 GEo. L.J. 1457 (1983) (authored
by Richard A. lift) (discussion of Supreme Court cases dealing with immigration and adminis-
trative checkpoints).
19. See infra text p. 1279-81.
20. 413 U.S. 266 (1973) (roving patrol stopped petitioner's car without suspicion or prob-
able cause and, while searching the vehicle, discovered he was transporting marijuana).
21. Id. at 267. Three procedures are used to detect illegal aliens: permanent checkpoints
consistently maintained in one location, temporary checkpoints varying in time and place, and
roving patrols stopping cars at the officer's discretion. Id.
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given by the statute to officers in selecting which cars to stop, disagreed. 22
The Court held that an officer on roving patrol must have a warrant and
either consent or probable cause to search and seize a vehicle.23
United States v. Ortiz24 presented a similar situation. The Court consid-
ered whether patrol officers at permanent checkpoints 25 must meet the Al-
meida-Sanchez reasonableness test to stop and search a vehicle as a roving
patrol.26 The government contended that the nature of permanent check-
points, as opposed to roving patrols, both limited officer discretion 27 and
made the search less intrusive.28 The Supreme Court disagreed and held
that the search and seizure of vehicles at permanent checkpoints was intru-
sive, and although it did not require a warrant, consent or probable cause
was required. 29
In situations where the validity of the search and seizure are separate, the
Court will apply a reasonable suspicion standard or a balancing test depend-
ing upon whether it has held that if the initial seizure is minimally intrusive
on individual rights.30 A secondary search, which is more intrusive than the
initial seizure, may still require consent or probable cause, however. 3'
In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,32 the government claimed that a rov-
ing patrol had the authority to stop a vehicle near the border, question the
citizenship of the occupants, and conduct a search at the officer's discre-
tion.33 The Supreme Court, however, required a less stringent reasonable-
ness standard for the initial questioning.34 The Brignoni-Ponce Court
considered the "balance between the public interest and the individual's
22. Id at 270.
23. Id at 273. The Court emphasized that a search at the discretion of an individual
police officer without a warrant, probable cause, or reasonable suspicion was "precisely the evil
the Court saw ... when it insisted that the 'discretion of the officials in the field be circum-
scribed by obtaining a warrant prior to the inspection.'" Id. at 270 (quoting Camara v. Mu-
nicipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532 (1967)).
24. 422 U.S. 891 (1975) (border patrol officers stopped vehicle at a permanent checkpoint
without reasonable suspicion or probable cause).
25. Id at 893. The checkpoints required all vehicles to pass officers. Officers stopped cars
suspected of transporting illegal aliens and questioned the citizenship of each occupant. If the
officer continued to suspect that the occupants were transporting aliens, he then had the au-
thority to search the vehicle. Id.
26. Id at 892.
27. Id. at 894. The government argued that the permanent nature of the checkpoint lim-
ited officer discretion in determining which vehicles to stop. Id
28. United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. at 894. The government contended that checkpoints
were less intrusive since motorists could see officers stopping other vehicles, and could detect
officer authority. Drivers, therefore, would be less likely to become annoyed or frightened. Id.
29. Id. at 897. The Court found that the low percentage of cars police officers actually
searched after initial questioning indicated that the discretionary authority of the officer and
the intrusion was still considerably high. Id. at 895.
30. See infra text p. 1280-81.
31. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 567 (1976) (brief stops do
not require probable cause or a warrant); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 882
(1975) (inspection beyond initial stop must be based on consent or probable cause).
32. 422 U.S. 873 (1975) (roving patrol stopped respondent's car and searched solely be-
cause the occupants looked Hispanic).
33. Id. at 875.
34. Id. at 878.
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right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers."' 3"
The Court held that a limited seizure to question the occupants complied
with constitutional standards36 due to the modest infringement on fourth
amendment rights, 37 and significant public interest.38 The Court held that
an officer may seize a vehicle if his observations lead him reasonably to sus-
pect the vehicle contains illegal aliens.39 A secondary search beyond initial
questioning, however, would require traditional probable cause or consent.40
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte41 addressed the more limited issue of
whether an officer could stop a motorist for brief questioning at a fixed
checkpoint without suspicion that the vehicle contained illegal aliens.42
Finding the procedure minimally intrusive, the Court judged its reasonable-
ness by balancing the public interest of immigration control against an indi-
vidual's fourth amendment rights against intrusion.43 The Court's
conclusion centered upon the significant need for routine checkpoint stops"
and the individual intrusion.45 Accordingly, since this procedure was "sub-
stantially less intrusive than arrest," the Court held that an officer does not
need specific suspicion to stop and question a motorist; probable cause could
be substituted for the balancing test.46
B. Administrative Searches
The Supreme Court used the reasoning of immigration checkpoint opin-
ions in Delaware v. Prouse47 to invalidate roving patrols checking a driver's
license and vehicle registration.48 The Court balanced the individual intru-
35. Id
36. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 874. The Court distinguished this case from Almeida
because the border patrol did not claim any authority to search cars, but only stopped and
questioned occupants regarding citizenship or immigration status. Id
37. Id at 880. The Court defined the intrusion as being modest because of the short
duration of the stop. On average, an officer does not stop a car for more than one minute, with
the inquiry limited to simple questions and possibly requests to produce basic documents. Id
38. Id at 884.
39. Id
40. Id. at 881.
41. 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (respondents' vehicles stopped for questioning at permanent ile-
gal alien checkpoints).
42. Id at 545.
43. Id at 555.
44. Id at 552.
45. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 559. The Court compared seizure at a fixed checkpoint
to seizure by a roving patrol and found the objective intrusion minimal and the subjective
intrusion considerably less than at a fixed checkpoint. The Court noted that at permanent
checkpoints, motorists saw visual signs of authority, officers stopped cars according to a proce-
dure, officers performed the stops with regularity, individual officers possessed significantly less
discretionary authority, the checkpoint purpose was limited, and minimal interference with
traffic occurred. Id
46. Id at 562. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 210 (1979). The Martinez-
Fuerte Court noted that individualized suspicion is generally required but "the Fourth Amend-
ment imposes no irreducible requirement of such suspicion." Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at
560.
47. 440 U.S. 648 (1978) (roving police officer stopped respondent's car to check license
and registration without any suspicion of safety or equipment violations).
48. Id at 658.
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
sion on the motorist, the promotion of legitimate governmental interests,
and the effectiveness of the police procedure.49 Although the Court found
the state interest legitimate, it held the roving stops an ineffective method to
promote these state interests5° because of the significant intrusion on an indi-
vidual.51 Since two of the three prongs of the balancing test were inapplica-
ble, the Court held that the search and seizure violated the fourth
amendment unless the officer had "at least [an] articulable and reasonable
suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or that an automobile is not registered
.... ",52 The Court suggested that a more routine and restricted checkpoint
involving substantially less discretionary authority by police might be consti-
tutional.5 3 The Court further stated that the "[q]uestioning of all oncoming
traffic at roadblock-type stops is one possible alternative."'5 4
In Brown v. Texas 55 the Court finalized a balancing test for evaluating the
reasonableness of seizures less intrusive than traditional arrest.56 Courts
must balance ". .. the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure,
the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity
of the interference with individual liberty."57
In determining the validity of sobriety checkpoints under the fourth
amendment, state courts have applied a variety of tests resulting in differing
analysis and outcomes.5 8 The Supreme Court addressed this issue in Michi-
49. Id. at 654.
50. Id. at 667. The Court found the subjective intrusion in the administrative stop similar
to a roving patrol to detect illegal aliens. Both involved significant discretion on the officer's
part and promoted fear and anxiety in the driver being detained. Id.
5 1. Id. at 659. The Court cited a number of alternative and effective methods for check-
ing a license and vehicle registration and held that roving spot checks were not significantly
more productive than alternative methods. Id. at 895.
52. Id at 663.
53. Id at 664. "This holding does not preclude the State of Delaware or other States
from developing methods for spot checks that involve less intrusion or that do not involve the
unconstrained exercise of discretion." Id (footnote omitted).
54. Id. at 664.
55. 443 U.S. 47 (1979) (police lacking any specific suspicion, stopped appellant outside an
alley cited as a "high drug problem area").
56. Id. at 51.
57. Id. The Court reasoned that ... a seizure must be based on either specific, objective
facts indicating... society's legitimate interests... (in] seiz[ing] the particular individual, or
that the seizure must be carried out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations
on the conduct of individual officers." Id. (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663
(1978)).
58. For cases concluding that sobriety checkpoints are constitutional, see Ingersoll v.
Palmer, 43 Cal. 3d 1321, 743 P.2d 1299, 1311, 241 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1987) (neutral criteria stan-
dard); People v. Bartley, 109 I11. 2d 273, 486 N.E.2d 880, 883 (1985) (balanced individual
intrusion versus need for the intrusion); State v. Deskins, 234 Kan. 529, 673 P.2d 1174, 1184
(1983) (balanced degree of legitimate governmental interest versus intrusion); State v. Coc-
como, 177 N.J. Super. 575, 427 A.2d 131, 134 (1980) (balance state interest against inconven-
ience). For cases holding sobriety checkpoints unconstitutional, see State v. Garcia, 489
N.E.2d 168, 171 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (state supervisory decision whether to use individual
suspicion or roadblocks); State v. McLaughlin, 471 N.E.2d 1125, 1136 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984)(balance gravity of concern served, degree it advances state interest and severity of intrusion);
State v. Smith, 674 P.2d 562, 563 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984) (balance the type of roadblock, its
purpose, and degree of intrusion).
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II. MICHIGAN DEPT. OF STATE POLICE V. SITZ
A. The Majority Opinion
In Sitz, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the initial stop
to question drivers at sobriety checkpoints violated the individual's right to
be free from unreasonable search and seizure.6w Justice Rehnquist, writing
for the majority, 61 approved the appellate court's application of the Brown
test, but disagreed with the court's conclusion on two of the three prongs. 62
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the sobriety checkpoint 63
after analyzing the substantial public interest in preventing drunk driving
tragedies, the effectiveness of this method in achieving the state goal, and the
minimal level of infringement the checkpoint has on personal liberties.64
The Court first stated that the initial stop constituted a seizure65 invoking
the reasonableness requirement in the fourth amendment. 66 Justice Rehn-
quist refuted the respondent's contention that the proper method of evaluat-
ing reasonableness was the Brown balancing test, not reasonable suspicion or
probable cause.67 Respondents interpreted National Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab68 as holding that law enforcement officials must show a
special governmental need before courts will apply a balancing test.6 9 The
majority disagreed, and relied on Martinez-Fuerte and Brown as the appro-
priate authorities because police stops on public highways represent a sub-
stantially less intrusive procedure than traditional arrest.70
59. Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 2485, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412, 419
(1990).
60. Id. The Court considered only the officer's initial stop, preliminary questioning, and
observations. Subsequent detention of an individual, the Court noted, may require some level
of suspicion. Id, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 420.
61. Id at 2481, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 418. Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia and Kennedy
joined Justice Rehnquist in this opinion. Id.
62. The majority agreed that the state possessed a grave interest in curtailing the drunk
driving problem in Michigan. Id at 2485, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 420. The Court, however, dis-
agreed with the appellate court's determination that the roadblock procedure overly intruded
on individual rights. Id at 2486, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 421. Further, the Court disagreed with the
lower court's conclusion that the procedure did not represent an effective means to curtail
drunk driving. Id. at 2487, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 422.
63. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2488, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 423.
64. Id. at 2492, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 428.
65. Id. at 2485, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 420. For a discussion on intrusiveness, see infra note 5
and accompanying text.
66. Id. at 2485, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 420.
67. Id. at 2484, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 419.
68. 109 S. Ct. 1384, 103 L. Ed. 2d 685 (1989) (respondents implemented a procedure
making customs service employee's promotions contingent on passing a urinalysis test).
69. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2485, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 420. The pertinent language is as follows:
"[w]here a Fourth Amendment intrusion serves special governmental needs, beyond the nor-
mal need for law enforcement, it is necessary to balance the individual's privacy expectations
against the Government's interest to determine whether it is impractical to require a warrant
or some level of individualized suspicion in the particular context." Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at
1390, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 702.
70. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2485, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 420.
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Agreeing with the appellate court, the majority in Sitz applied the first
prong of the Brown balancing test and recognized the substantial state inter-
est in curtailing drunk driving accidents on public highways.7 1 The Court
cited statistics which showed that drunk drivers are responsible for over
25,000 deaths and personal injuries every year.72 Checking the second prong
of the Brown test, the majority weighed state interest with personal intrusion
on the stopped motorist.73 The Court compared this intrusion to the immi-
gration stops it approved in Martinez-Fuerte74 and, in contrast to the appel-
late court, labeled the intrusion minimal. 75 The Court found the "objective"
intrusion, or the duration and intensity of the seizure, minimal.76 Further,
the Court found the "subjective" intrusion, or the fear and surprise, mod-
est77 because "[a]t traffic checkpoints the motorist can see officers stop other
vehicles, he can see visible signs of the officers' authority and he is much less
likely to be frightened or annoyed by the intrusion. 7 8
Looking to the third and final prong of the Brown balancing test, the effec-
tiveness of sobriety checkpoints in protecting the state's legitimate interest,79
the Court majority disagreed with the appellate court conclusion that the
procedure was ineffective.8 0 First, the Court noted that a governmental pro-
cedure need only advance the public interest under the balancing test.8 1
State officials with knowledge and experience in the relevant area must,
therefore, use discretion in selecting which specific procedure to utilize.8 2
The Court held that the judiciary is not authorized to determine which of
the many reasonable procedures most effectively achieves this state goal.8 3
In distinguishing Prouse v. Delaware, the majority concluded its effectiveness
analysis by considering whether the empirical evidence indicated that the
procedure advanced the public interest. The government in Prouse offered
no empirical data showing that random stops of vehicles to check license and
71. Id.
72. Id. See 4 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 10.8(d) (2d ed. 1987). See also South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 558
(1983) (documentation of carnage from drunk drivers); Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432,
439 (1957) ("The increasing slaughter on our highways, most of which should be avoidable,
now reaches the astounding figures only heard of on the battlefield.").
73. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2486, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 421.
74. Id., 110 L. Ed. 2d at 422. The Court found no difference between the two types of
checkpoints except for the type of questions asked. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2486, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 422. The Court judges "subjective" intrusion
by the fear and surprise of law abiding citizens, not drunk drivers. Since the Michigan Court
of Appeals concluded that the subjective intrusion was unreasonable, the majority assumed
that it misread previous Supreme Court cases and included drunk drivers in the analysis. Id.
78. Id. (quoting United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 894 (1975)).
79. Id. at 2487, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 422.
80. Sitz, 110 S.Ct. at 2487, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 422.
81. Id.; see Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979).
82. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2487, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 422.
83. Id., 110 L. Ed. 2d at 423. The majority disagreed with the Michigan Court of Ap-
peals' conclusion that court testimony demonstrated the ineffectiveness of these roadblocks
and, as a result, did not futher state interests. Id.
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registration resulted in increased public safety.84 The government in Sitz
offered two forms of evidence. First, the State of Michigan showed that on
its single night of operation, the checkpoint in question resulted in two
drunk driving arrests out of 126 vehicles stopped. Thus, approximately 1.5
percent of cars checked resulted in arrest.85 Second, expert testimony veri-
fied that the average 1% rate of arrest at sobriety checkpoints was univer-
sal. 86 In comparing the similarity between this percentage arrest rate for
drunk driving to the rate of deportation cited in Martinez-Fuerte,87 the
Court found no reason to differentiate the two cases and held that the proce-
dure's effectiveness and the advancement of public interest existed.88
B. Justice Blackmun's Concurrence
Justice Blackmun concurred in the judgment;89 he agreed with the analy-
sis and resulting conclusion and recalled past opinions which documented
his dedication to preventing the dangers posed by drunk drivers on public
highways. 90 Justice Blackmun offered no alternative to or disagreement
with the majority rationale.91
C. Justice Brennan's Dissent
Justice Brennan dissented,92 objecting to two majority points. First, he
criticized the majority's inference that the Brown balancing test applied to all
police stops on public highways. 93 He questioned the majority's holding
that only where the seizure is "substantially less intrusive" than a traditional
arrest will the Court dismiss the need for probable cause or reasonableness
and substitute a balancing test.94 Although Justice Brennan acknowledged
that the stop in this case constituted a less intrusive procedure than a tradi-
tional arrest, he argued that minimal intrusiveness, rather than the actual
stop and seizure, properly triggered the Brown balancing test.95
Second, Justice Brennan disagreed with the majority's parallel application
of Martinez-Fuerte to Sitz. 96 He contended that the Court in Martinez-Fu-
erte allowed police stops without suspicion because heavy traffic flow made it
84. Id.; see also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 (1978) (the court held that finding
unlicensed drivers at random stops is much less likely than finding unlicensed drivers stopped
pursuant to traffic violations).
85. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2487, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 423.
86. Id. at 2488, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 423.
87. Id The Court upheld ratio of aliens caught and deported to cars stopped equal to .12
percent as adequate empirical data. Id
88. Id.
89. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2488, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 424.
90. Id; See Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 657 (1971) (Blackmun, J., concurring); Tate
v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 401 (1971) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
91. Id., 110 L. Ed. 2d at 424.
92. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2488, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 424. Justice Marshall joined Justice Brennan
in his dissent. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 2489, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 425.
95. Id.
96. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2489, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 425.
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impossible for officers to scrutinize each car in order to develop a reasonable
suspicion as to the presence of illegal aliens.97 Brennan argued that in Sitz,
the government presented no evidence that a similar problem existed in de-
tecting drunk drivers. 98 He contended that before sobriety checkpoints
could be validated by the fourth amendment, regardless of their intrusive-
ness, proof must necessarily show that an individualized suspicion standard
could not be met through traditional procedures. 99
D. Justice Stevens' Dissent
In a second dissent, Justice Stevens' °° contended that the majority misap-
plied the Brown balancing test and offered a three part argument in support
of his position. 101 In part I, Justice Stevens maintained that temporary
drunk driving checkpoints resemble roving patrols, not permanent check-
points.102 First, he noted that temporary checkpoints come as a surprise to
motorists whereas at permanent checkpoints, the driver has the option of
avoiding the checkpoint. 10 3 Second, a temporary checkpoint creates fear
and anxiety in the motorist because a driver approaches unaware of its exist-
ence.104 Third, temporary sobriety checkpoints put more discretionary au-
thority in the hands of police officers. 05 In border and license stops
motorists must produce a document, whereas in sobriety checks, police have
the discretion to subjectively suspect a driver of being intoxicated. 1°6
Fourth, Stevens noted that most permanent checkpoints operate during
daylight, whereas sobriety checkpoints operate in darkness, and thus are far
more offensive to drivers.107 In contending that United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce controls the instant case, Justice Stevens would require police to prove
that sobriety checkpoints are the most effective means of curtailing drunk
drivers in order to justify the intrusion on the individual's fourth amendment
rights. 10 8
In part II, Justice Stevens agreed with the majority regarding both the
indisputable public concern over drunk driving °9 and the modest intrusion
97. Id.; see United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 557 (1976).
98. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2489, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 426.
99. Id. at 2490, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 426. Justice Brennan acknowledged the state interest, yet
noted that "... consensus that a particular law enforcement technique serves a laudable pur-
pose has never been the touchstone of constitutional analysis." Id.
100. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2490, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 426. Justices Brennan and Marshall joined
Justice Stevens in parts I and II of his dissent. Id.
101. Id. at 2492-97, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 428-35.
102. Id. at 2492, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 428.
103. Ic, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 429. Stevens noted that temporary checkpoints were neither
preceded by notice nor predictable from weekend to weekend. Id
104. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2493, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 429. Stevens contended that fear and appre-




107. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2493, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 430.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 2494, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 431.
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on private rights, 110 but disagreed that sobriety checkpoints constituted an
effective procedure to curtail drunk drivers on public highways.-11 Stevens
pointed to both a lack of actual evidence that checkpoints serve as a more
effective arrest mechanism than conventional patrols, and a lack of police
officer support for sobriety checkpoints as an arrest tool.' 1 2
In part III, Justice Stevens emphasized the majority's seeming lack of con-
cern with an individual's interest in remaining free from "suspicionless,
unannounced, investigatory seizures." 113 He argued that sobriety check-
points are unacceptable because they are inherently discretionary and occur
at times when an individual possesses a reasonable expectation of privacy." 4
Stevens noted that law enforcement officials do not evenly apply the check-
point procedures, the officer discretionarily decides when and where to set
up the checkpoints and may conduct more or less thorough searches depend-
ing on the circumstances.1 5 Notwithstanding the positive effects that pub-
licity of conducting sobriety checkpoints may have on reducing the number
of drunk drivers, Justice Stevens concluded that the checkpoints are too
great an infringement on an individual's fourth amendment rights." 6
III. CONCLUSION
In Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, the Supreme Court held
sobriety checkpoints constitutional under the fourth amendment. The Court
applied a three-part balancing test from Brown v. Texas, weighing the intru-
sion on personal rights, the state's public policy interest, and the effective-
ness of the program in achieving state goals. The Court found the state's
interest in curtailing drunk driving incidents on public highways substantial,
the individual intrusion on personal freedom minimal, and the effectiveness
of the procedure substantiated through statistical evidence. Justice Brennan
dissented and argued that officials should apply the balancing test only if
they can demonstrate that a reasonable suspicion standard is ineffective to
meet state goals. Justice Stevens, in a second dissent, argued that the major-
ity should not have applied the Brown balancing test, and further argued
that even if the Brown test did apply, law enforcement officials had not met
all three prongs of the test.
The majority's decision requires courts to determine the degree to which
the checkpoint procedure intrudes on an individual's personal liberty. If the
110. Id at 2495, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 432. Stevens strongly disagreed with this conclusion, but
conceded that "my difference with the Court may amount to nothing less than a difference in
our respective evaluations of the importance of individual liberty ...
111. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2495, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 432.
112. Id., 110 L. Ed. 2d at 433. Given officer praise for the deterrent effect of sobriety
roadblocks, the majority's analysis of arrest rates did not prove cogent for Justice Stevens. Id.
113. Id at 2497, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 435.
114. Id While verifing his support for other checkpoints that have procedural neutrality,
such as in an airline context, Justice Stevens isolated sobriety checkpoints as random and
suspicionless. Id.
115. Id. at 2498, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 436.
116. Id. at 2499, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 437; see Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct.
1384, 1401, 103 L. Ed. 2d 685, 715 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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procedure is substantially less intrusive than a traditional arrest, law en-
forcement officials can dismiss probable cause and reasonable suspicion and
apply a balancing test. If the procedure is substantially intrusive, the offi-
cials must meet the probable cause or reasonable suspicion standard.
Although this decision is laudable in theory and the public will undeniably
embrace it as a positive step toward curtailing the drunk driving problems,
the majority's opinion leaves some troubling questions unanswered. First,
the majority does not seem to follow its traditional concern for unbridled
police discretion. Although the nature of the permanent drunk driving
checkpoint reduces police discretion in who they pull over, the officer still
looks at a driver's eyes, listens to his speech and evaluates his answers, and
then decides whether to subject the driver to a secondary stop. Second, the
Court apparently considered no evidence regarding the effectiveness of the
permanent roadblocks in relation to other methods of detecting drunk driv-
ers. This consideration was important to the Supreme Courts' decision in
Delaware v. Prouse. Here, the Supreme Court utilized this evidence to con-
clude that random stops were not more effective than other methods to
check drivers' licenses and registration. It remains to be seen how individual
states will evaluate the Supreme Court's factors and whether this decision
will have a positive impact on the number of drunk driving deaths on public
highways.
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